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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines whether the adoption of clawback provisions decreases earnings 
management. Clawback provisions are intended to discourage managers' opportunistic 
behavior by enabling companies to recoup erroneously awarded compensation in the 
event of an accounting restatement. Using firms that voluntarily implement clawback 
provisions, I find that clawback-adopters experience a reduction in both accrual-based 
and real earnings management in the post-adoption period, relative to non-adopters. 
These results are robust to multiple approaches controlling for endogeneity of the 
clawback decision. In addition, these results are also consistent within subsamples of 
firms facing high level of incentives to manage earnings, suggesting that clawback 
provisions remain effective in curbing accrual-based earnings management even when 
managers are under more pressure to manipulate earnings. Overall, the findings are 
consistent with clawback adoption signaling a move towards overall higher reporting 
quality. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines whether voluntary application of clawback provisions is 
associated with subsequent reduction in managers' opportunistic behavior. In particular, I 
study how voluntary adoption of clawback provisions affects two earnings management 
strategies: accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation. 
Clawback provisions enable companies to recoup compensation from managers if the 
financial statements, upon which the compensation is based, are restated in later periods. 
Clawbacks are intended to function as a corporate governance mechanism, and thus are 
expected to enhance reporting integrity by increasing the cost of untruthful reporting. 
While not mandatory, many companies have voluntarily included clawback provisions in 
the compensation contracts with executives. Using a sample of firms that voluntarily 
initiate clawback provisions, I find that clawbacks improve earnings quality and decrease 
managers' opportunistic behavior. 1 
The extant literature documents the effects of voluntary clawback adoption, 
suggesting that clawbacks improve earnings quality as perceived by market participants 
(e.g., equity investors) and monitors (e.g., auditors). For example, Chan et al. (2012a) 
documents a reduction in the likelihood of restatements and audit fees, and attributes 
these findings to an improvement in earnings quality. However, it is possible that auditors 
wrongly believe that the quality of financial reporting improves subsequent to the 
adoption and respond by reducing audit effort, resulting in the reduction in audit fees and 
restatements (Denis 20 12). Little is known about how managers react to clawback 
Following Dehaan et al. (2013), I define earnings quality as the extent to which the financial 
statements are prepared without managers' opportunistic behavior. 
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provisions, and perhaps more importantly, how managers change their earnings 
management strategies. This topic is relevant, since clawbacks have become more 
common in executives' compensation contracts, and soon will be mandatory for all listed 
firms as required by the Dodd-Frank Act. This study fills this gap by examining the 
changes in actual earnings quality after the adoption. That is, I expand on prior clawback 
studies by focusing on whether clawback adoption changes earnings management 
behavior. 
Accordingly, I investigate the changes in both accrual-based and real activities 
manipulation subsequent to the initiation of clawbacks. First, I examine whether 
clawbacks discourage managers to engage in accruals manipulation. As documented in 
extant literature, accrual-based earnings management draws more scrutiny from auditors 
and the SEC (Dec how et al. 1996), thereby increasing the likelihood of restatement in 
later periods. Subsequent to the implementation of clawback provisions, I expect that the 
actual and/or perceived cost of accrual-based earnings management increases, making 
accruals manipulation less attractive to managers. Further, clawback adoption can signal 
firms' commitment of improving corporate governance, thereby decreasing accrual-based 
earnings management. Empirical results confirm these expectations. Specifically, I find 
that clawback-adopting firms exhibit a reduction across three measures of accrual-based 
earnings management: the absolute value of discretionary accruals; income-increasing 
discretionary accruals; and income-decreasing accruals. This reduction is relative to a 
2 
benchmark sample of non-adopting firms. 2 Overall, these results suggest that firms 
adopting clawback provisions exhibit a decrease in accrual-based earnings management 
in the post-adoption period, relative to non-adopters. 
Next, I investigate the association between clawback adoption and subsequent 
changes in real earnings management, developing a two-tailed prediction. Prior studies 
document that managers substitute real activities manipulation with accrual-based 
earnings management, and that the preference of earnings manipulation methods is based 
on the relative costliness (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin 201 0; Zang 20 12). Consistent with a 
substitution effect proposed in these studies, I predict that managers will increase real 
earnings management behavior. That is, clawback adoption is expected to increase the 
cost of accruals-based earnings management, but has a relatively lower (or no) effect on 
the cost of real earnings management, which does not technically violate GAAP, and is 
unlikely to result in future restatements. On the other hand, clawback adoption can signal 
a firm's commitment to improve overall financial reporting (i.e., a signaling effect), 
which would lead to reductions in all earnings management activities. Prior literature 
documents that restatements and managers' misbehavior are positively associated with 
clawback adoption (Addy et al. 2009; Babenko, Bennett et al. 2012), and thus clawback 
adoption signals firms' determination to monitor managers more closely. Consistent with 
this latter, I find that subsequent to clawback adoption, real earnings management also 
2 Non-adopting firms are alternatively defined as (I) non-adopting firms in S&PISOO index (in 
Section 3), (2) non-adopting firms that are propensity-score matched (in Section 6), and (3) 
non-adopting frrms that are sized matched (also Section 6). 
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decreases. This finding is inconsistent with the argument of a substitution effect in 
earnings management methods, and consistent with a signaling effect. 
Finally, I perform subsample analysis to examine whether the effectiveness of 
clawback provisions changes when managers have more incentives to manipulate 
earnings. Following prior literature (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998; Degeorge et al. 1999), I 
identify two situations in which earnings management is more likely to occur: when firms 
conduct seasoned equity offerings in the following year; and when firms just meet/beat 
earnings benchmarks. I fmd that managers under clawback provisions decrease accrual 
manipulation under either of these conditions; that is, even when the benefits from 
earnings manipulation are greater. Furthermore, firms with clawbacks exhibit a reduction 
in real earnings management when they have seasoned equity offering in the following 
year. This evidence remains consistent with clawback adoption being a signal of 
commitment to improve reporting quality, even when managers have higher incentives to 
manipulate earnings. 
Taken together, my results suggest that after the initiation of clawback provisions, 
managers decrease opportunistic behavior, reflected in diminished earnings management 
through either accrual-based or real activities manipulation. The reduction in earnings 
management is consistent with an improvement in financial reporting quality. These 
results help to relieve the concern that voluntary clawbacks represent ineffective 
governance changes (i.e., "cheap talk"). As documented in Fried and Shilon (2011), more 
than 90% of S&P500 firms give directors discretion to enforce clawbacks; however, 
directors seldom use their discretion to recoup compensation from executives. Babenko et 
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al. (20 12) finds that there is no instance in which the directors enforce claw back 
provisions subsequent to a fmancial restatement. However, if managers perceive 
clawback provisions as cheap talk, this should bias against finding decreases in earnings 
management across the pre- and post-adoption periods; My results suggest the opposite: 
both accrual and real earnings management decrease subsequent to adoption, indicating 
managers perceive clawbacks as a credible threat. 
Section 2 discusses the background, prior literature, and hypotheses development. 
Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 discusses the sample and descriptive 
statistics. Section 5 provides the main findings. Section 6 presents sensitivity tests and 
robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Background, Literature Review, and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Clawback Provisions 
A clawback provision is intended to ex-ante deter managers' opportunistic 
behavior. It is included in the compensation contract between a company and employees, 
which empowers the company to recover compensation from employees ex-post if a pre-
defined triggering event occurs. The "clawback" provision was first introduced by 
Section 304 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter, SOX 304) in 2002 in response to 
public concern that management was benefitting from misstated financial statements. 
SOX 304 provides that if a company needs to restate its financial statements as a result of 
previous misconducts, CEOs and CFOs must reimburse the company for bonuses or other 
incentive-based or equity-based compensation, as well as any profits realized from the 
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sale of securities of the company during the 12-month period after the financial 
information was first publicly issued or filed with the SEC. Though SOX 304 has been in 
place since 2002, executives may not perceive clawback provisions as a credible threat 
for two primary reasons. First, the triggering event is restatements resulting from 
misconducts; however, financial restatements may oc.cur for other reasons (e.g., clerical 
errors and misunderstanding of accounting standards) not related misconducts (Plumlee 
and Yohn 2010). Second, under SOX 304, the enforcement mechanism to seek 
recoupment from CEOs and CFOs is the SEC rather than boards or shareholders of 
companies. Due to limited resources, the SEC is likely to pursue only a few cases against 
CEOs and CFOs each year (Fried and Shilon 2011), suggesting the probability of 
recouped compensation for a manager is low. 3 
In late 2006, the SEC released new compensation disclosure rules. This included a 
new requirement for a company to discuss its policies regarding adjustments or 
recoveries of compensation previously awarded if the performance measures upon which 
the compensation are based are restated or adjusted. After 2006, hundreds of firms 
voluntarily adopted clawback provisions, an increase likely attributable to the new 
compensation disclosure rules (Chan et al. 2012a). 
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law. Section 954 ofthe Dodd-Frank 
Act (hereafter DF A 954) requires all listed companies to adopt clawback provisions. 
DF A 954 differs from SOX 304 in two critical aspects: (1) it requires the enforcement 
body to be the board of directors, rather than the SEC; and (2) the triggering event is 
3 In fact, the SEC did not enforce SOX 304 until2007, when they filed the first SOX 304 claim 
against the former CEO of Mercury Interactive (SEC 2007). 
6 
restatements, even if not due to misconduct. Currently, the SEC is developing regulations 
to implement DF A 954; thus, it is unclear when all listed companies will be required to 
implement it. However, though clawback provisions are not yet mandatory, many firms 
have voluntarily adopted these provisions.4 
2. 2 Literature Review 
A recent and growing body of literature studies the determinants and 
consequences of clawback provisions. Regarding the determinants of clawback adoption, 
research finds that the propensity to adopt clawbacks increases with firm size, prior 
restatements, and CEO influences in the company (e.g., Addy et al. 2009; Brown et al. 
2011; Babenko et al. 20 12). 
Prior research also examines the consequences of clawback adoption, focusing on 
earnings quality, information asymmetry, and CEO compensation subsequent to the 
implementation of firm-initiated clawbacks. Regarding earnings quality, Chan et al. 
(20 12a) documents that clawback provisions reduce (1) the likelihood of financial 
restatements, (2) the likelihood of receiving material internal control weakness from 
auditors, and (3) audit fees. The paper further documents that clawback-adopters exhibit 
increased earnings response coefficients (ERC) after adoption. Expanding on this study, 
Dehaan et al. (2013) finds a reduction in firms' just meeting/beating analyst forecast 
frequency, and a reduction in analyst forecast dispersion, after clawback implementation. 
However, the paper fails to find an increase in ERC as compared to non-adopters. 
4 For example, the percentage of clawback-adopters in Fortune 100 companies has increased 
from 1 7.6% to 82.1% from 2006 to 201 0 (Equilar 201 0). 
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Building on the notion that clawback-adopters provide financial statements of 
higher quality, prior research also examines if information asymmetry between 
management and investors declines after clawback adoption. Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
(2012) examines the changes in information environment in the pre- and post-adoption 
periods. The paper finds a positive short-window market reaction to the announcement of 
adoption, which is more positive for firms with restatements before adoption. The paper 
further documents a reduction in bid-ask spreads for the restating firms following the 
adoption. 
Finally, prior research examines how clawbacks influence executive 
compensation. Researchers conjecture that as clawback provisions increase the risk 
imposed on the manager by increasing the probability of returning compensation in the 
future, managers will demand more compensation to offset this increased risk. The 
empirical evidence, however, is mixed. Dehaan et al. (2013) finds that in the post-
adoption period, there is an increase in total CEO compensation, which is mainly driven 
by an increase in base salary. Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012), on the other hand, fails to 
find that clawbacks add additional costs to the adopters. 
A concurrent paper (Chan et al. 2012b) warrants further discussion, as it examines 
the substitution effect between accrual-based and real earnings management subsequent 
to the adoption of clawbacks. My study differs from theirs in several ways. First, their 
sample includes firm-initiated clawbacks in Russell 3000 firms from 2000-2009, while 
my sample includes firms in S&P 1500 from 2000-2011; thus, their sample skews 
towards smaller firms. Second, the research methods used to estimate earnings 
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management differ. While Chan et al. (20 12b) uses a model not fully linked to prior 
research, my model follows the extant literature directly (Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012).5 
Finally, the papers reach opposite conclusions: Chan et al. (2012b) finds that clawbacks 
reduce the absolute value of accruals (mainly driven by a decrease in positive 
discretionary accruals) and increase real earnings management (mainly driven by an 
increase in discretionary expenses); however, I fmd that both accrual-based and real 
earnings management decrease in the post-adoption period.6 
2. 3 Hypotheses Development 
As Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggests, the agency problem arises when 
separation exists between the stockholders ofthe company and the managers. Self-
interested managers would put less effort into the management process, and engage in 
actions that benefit themselves at the costs of stockholders. One solution to this is to 
provide. managers an incentive compensation system, which allows the managers to share 
the upper tail of earnings distribution. While incentive compensation systems can 
encourage managers to exert high effort, they may also incentivize managers to engage in 
earnings manipulation to maximize their personal wealth. Recent studies document that 
managers engage in aggressive accounting to maximize compensation; for example, 
5 The current literature examines the tradeoff in earnings management by estimating a baseline 
regression model with alternate earnings management proxies as dependent variables and fixed 
independent variables (e.g., Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012). My study follows the existing 
literatUre, while Chan et al. (20 12b) uses alternate dependent variables and different 
independent variables. Accordingly, their method makes it hard to draw inferences regarding 
changes in relative costliness in earnings management following adoption. 
6 As explained in detail later, the main difference lies in discretionary expenses. My summary 
statistics, however, is comparable to the existing literature. 
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Jensen (2005) suggests that equity-based compensation is a primary source of accounting 
manipulation and fraudulent reporting. Further, Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) 
finds that CEO's option holdings increase the likelihood of restatements and severe 
accounting irregularities. Since shareholders often suffer great losses after restatements 
(Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz 2004), and are concerned that executives benefit from 
restatements, clawback provisions have become increasingly popular inclusions in 
management compensation contracts to reduce the likelihood of restatements and 
improve the firm's overall corporate governance. 
Clawback provisions make restatements more costly to managers. Without 
clawbacks, managers suffer career penalties and reputational damage following 
restatements (Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins 2006), but likely retain ill-gotten compensation. 
Under clawback provisions, such compensation must be reimbursed back to the company 
when the financial statements are restated in later periods, thus making restatements more 
costly to managers. Desai et al. (2006) argues that if managers know that they will be 
punished through job loss or lower income following restatements, then such an ex post 
settling up will decrease managers' incentives to engage in earnings manipulation In a 
similar vein, since a claw back provision makes managers bear more risk if they engage in 
activities that are likely to result in financial restatements, managers under clawback 
provisions should be more prone to reduce accrual-based earnings management as it 
draws more auditors' and SEC's attention. 
On the other hand, clawback adoption can signal a commitment to improve 
earnings quality. As documented in prior studies (Addy et al. 2009; Babenko et al. 2012), 
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restatements and managers' misbehavior are positively associated with clawback 
adoption, making boards of directors aware of the need to monitor managers more closely. 
Thus, the decision to adopt clawback provisions can signal firms' commitment to 
enhance financial reporting quality (Denis 20 12). In this situation, as corporate 
governance improves, accrual earnings management should decrease following adoption. 
Thus, based on both increasing costs and signaling, I predict the following (in 
alternative form): 
H1: After the adoption of clawback, accrual-based earnings management 
decreases. 
There is a growing body of literature examining how managers use real activities 
manipulation, in addition to accrual-based earnings management, to reach earnings 
targets. Real activities manipulation is managers' suboptimal action that deviates from 
normal business practices to distort reported earnings, and is achieved by structuring 
transactions, such as sales discounts, overproduction, and a reduction in discretionary 
expenditures (Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012). As Fields et al. (2001) suggests, 
studying only the changes in accrual-based earnings management may obscure the 
overall effect of available accounting choices. That is, evidence of a decrease in one kind 
of earnings management should not lead to a definitive conclusion that clawback 
provisions reduce earnings management; in fact, this may be a result of a substitution 
from one kind to another type of earnings management. Several studies examine the 
simultaneous use of accrual-based and real earnings management. Cohen et al. (2008) 
and Zang (2012) find that firms substitute accrual-based earnings management with real 
activities manipulation, with Zang (2012) arguing that managers choose between accrual 
11 
and real earnings management based on their relative costliness. Following this 
"substitution effect" argument, in the post-adoption period managers may increase real 
earnings management, which would not be subject to restatement in later periods. The 
above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2A: After the adoption of clawbacks, the extent of real earnings management 
increases due to a substitution effect. 
On the other hand, real earnings management may decrease after clawback 
adoption. As discussed previously, clawback adoption could signal of commitment to 
improve reporting quality. As directors exert stronger monitoring efforts over all earnings 
management activities, managers may feel the increased pressure of enhancing reporting 
quality. In this situation, as directors and managers are aware of this enhanced 
commitment of improving corporate governance, real earnings management should 
decrease subsequent to the adoption, leading to the following: 
H2s: After the adoption of clawbacks, the extent of real earnings management 
decreases due to a signaling effect. 
3. Research Design 
3.1 The Effect of Clawback Adoption on Earnings Management 
Following Chan et al. (2012a), I estimate the following regression to examine 
whether clawback provisions affect firms' earnings management behavior: 
EMit = ao + O.JClawu + a2Clawajieru 
+ eit 
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(1) 
where EM is the earnings management proxy of interest (defined later); Claw is an 
indicator variable that equals one ifthe company is a clawback-adopter, and zero if it is a 
non-adopter; and Clawafter is an indicator variable that equals one for firm-years in 
which clawback-adopters have clawback in place, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on 
Clawafter, a2, measures changes in the earnings management proxy of interest across the 
pre- and post-adoption periods for adopters, compared to the changes in the sample 
period for the control firms: this is the test ofH1 (when accrual-based earnings 
management is the dependent variable) and Hz (when real earnings management is the 
dependent variable). 7 
Following prior studies on earnings management (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et 
al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012), I include the following variables to 
control for systematic variation in the earnings management proxy. logMV is the 
logarithm of market value of equity, which is included to proxy for numerous omitted 
variables. MTB is the market-to-book ratio, which is included to control for growth 
opportunities. ROA is the return on assets, which is included to control for profitability. 
Leverage is the leverage ratio, which is included to control for the closeness to covenant 
violation, and is expected to be positively associated with discretionary accruals (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo 1994). NOA is an indicator variable that equals one ifthe beginning net 
operating assets divided by sales in year t-1 is higher than the mean of corresponding 
industry-year; this is included to control the extent of accrual management in previous 
7 This regression does not include After to capture the change in earnings management across 
the pre- and post-adoption periods for non-adopter firms, because non-adopters, by definition, 
do not have the post-adoption period. 
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periods (Barton and Simko 2002). Big4 is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
company is audited by one of the Big 4 auditors, and zero otherwise; this is included to 
control for scrutiny from auditors, and is predicted to be negatively associated with 
accrual earnings management. Because earnings management proxies are measured as 
the deviation from the expected level in each industry-year grouping, all continuous 
control variables are measured as the deviation from the respective industry-year mean. 
3.2 Earnings Management Proxies 
3. 2.1 Accrual-Based Earnings Management Proxy 
I use discretionary accruals as the proxy for accrual earnings management. I 
estimate the modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones 1991) to obtain the expected 
accruals, and then subtract the expected accruals from actual accruals to obtain 
unexpected accruals. The following regression model is estimated for each industry-year 
grouping with at least 15 observations: 
-
A_cc_r_u_al_s::.:oit _ R + R 1 + R llSalesit + R PPEit 
-PO Pl P2 P3 +Tit Assetsit-1 Assetsic-1 Assetsic- 1 Assetsit-1 
(2) 
where for year t, Accruals is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations minus operating cash flows from the statement of cash flows, Assets is the 
total assets, !!,.Sales is the change in sales revenue from year t-1 to year t, and PPE is the 
gross value of property, plant and equipment. The estimated residuals from Equation (2) 
are discretionary accruals. 
I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the main proxy for accrual-
based earnings management. The absolute value of accruals captures the extent that 
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earnings are managed without consierting whether earnings are increased or decreased in 
a specific time period. Because I do not a priori predict whether earnings are manipulated 
upward or downward, I perceive large absolute value of discretionary accruals indicating 
lower earnings quality. 
To better identify any change in earnings management behavior associated with 
clawback adoption, I then partition discretionary accruals into observations exhibiting 
positive versus negative accruals. Clawback provisions increase the costs of accrual 
earnings management, and this incremental cost is a function of the probability of 
restatement and the excess pay. With respect to positive discretionary accruals, the 
incremental cost is high as positive accruals increase both the probability of restatement 
and the excess pay. Positive accruals also draw more attention from the regulator and 
auditors, resulting in a higher likelihood of restatement (DeF ond and Jiambalvo 1991; 
Dechow et al. 1996); in addition, they increase net income, resulting higher compensation 
and the amount to be recouped. 
The incremental cost of negative accruals is also positive, but likely less than that 
of positive accruals. Even though negative accruals draw less attention than positive 
accruals, the probability of restatement still increases if managers use negative accruals to 
manipulate earnings. The excess pay associated with restating negative accruals for a 
particular period may be zero; however, negative accruals make net income higher in the 
following periods, resulting in positive total excess pay. Overall, the cost of negative 
accruals increases in the post-adoption period. 
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Accordingly, I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals as the main proxy 
for accrual-based earnings management, and positive and negative discretionary accruals 
as supplemental tests to examine the source of changes in the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. 
3. 2. 2 Real Earnings Management Proxy 
Consistent with prior research (Roychowdhury 2006; Zhang 2012), I focus on two 
real activities manipulation methods: reporting lower cost of goods sold by 
overproduction, and cutting discretionary expenses to inflate earnings. I derive the real 
earnings management proxy using the following steps. 
First, to determine whether the firm engages in overproduction, I estimate the 
following regression for each industry-year combination with at least 15 observations to 
obtain the expected level of production: 
Prodit + ( 1 ) + ( Salesit ) + ( t::.Salesit ) 
--=---=Yo Y1 Yz Y3 Assetsit-1 Assetsit- 1 Assetsit-1 Assetsit-1 
+ (t::.Salesit- 1 ) + V . 
Y4 Assetsit-1 Lt (3) 
where PRODu denotes production costs in period t, which equals costs of goods sold and 
changes in inventory from year t-1 to year t; the estimated residuals, vu from Equation (3) 
are abnormal production costs. The higher the residual, the higher magnitude that the 
firm increases reported earnings through overproduction. 
Second, discretionary expenses include selling, general, and administrative 
expenses (SG&A), research and development expenditures (R&D), and advertising 
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expenses. The abnormal discretionary expense is the estimated residual of the following 
regression, which predicts the normal level of discretionary expenditures. Equation ( 4) is 
run cross-sectionally for each industry-year grouping with at least 15 observations: 
Disexpit = 00 + 01 ( 1 ) + 02 ( Salesit-1) + (/)it Assetsit-1 Assetsit-1 Assetsit-1 (4) 
Disexpit is the sum of SG&A, R&D, and advertising expenses. I multiply the estimated 
residuals of Equation (4) by -1 so that higher amount of residuals indicates greater 
amount of discretionary expenditure has been cut to inflate earnings. 
Third, I construct a comprehensive measure, RM, by summing abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses to capture the total effect of real 
activities manipulation. 
4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Sample Construction 
I use four main data sources: (1) hand-collected data on clawback adoption from 
EDGAR; (2) fmancial information from Compustat; (3) analyst forecast estimates from 
I/B/E/S; and (4) seasoned equity offerings from Securities Data Company (SDC). I also 
supplement my data set with information from Audit Analytics and ExecuComp for 
robustness tests. 
To calculate the earnings management proxies, I use all firms retrieved from 
Compustat with sufficient fmancial data to estimate Equations (2) to (4). I exclude firms 
in the financial (SIC6000-6999) and regulated industries (SIC 4400-5000), which have 
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different reporting requirements.8 Next, I retain only firms that are constituents of the 
S&P 1500 at any time during 2000 to 2011. This restricted sample both reduces the cost 
of hand-collection of data, and ensures wide economic coverage of U.S. market 
capitalization. For each firm, I search the proxy statements in EDGAR to determine if the 
firm has voluntarily adopted claw back provisions that are triggered by a restatement. 9 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedures. After deleting 
firm-year observations without data on control variables in Equation (1), I have 14,823 
firm-year observations. Panel B provides industry breakdowns. The sample consists of 
425 firms with clawback provisions in place as of 2011, and 1,244 firms without 
clawback provisions. Similar to the industry composition for the full sample, the 
manufacturing industry has 255 clawback-adopters, representing the largest clawback-
adoption industry. Panel C presents yearly distribution. Firms start to adopt clawback 
provisions in 2005, with widespread adoption by 2008. 
[TABLE 1] 
4. 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A ofTable 2 reports descriptive statistics for clawback-adopters and non-
adopters, revealing the following differences in firm characteristics across the two 
groupings. Compared to non-adopters, clawback-adopters are larger (logAssets and 
8 Financial firms, which received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (T ARP), are 
required to adopt clawback provisions, while this study examines voluntary clawback 
provisions. 
9 The triggering events include restatements, non-compete and early departures (Babenko et at. 
2012). Clawbacks triggered by a restatement is the most common category, and are directly 
related to earnings management. 
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logMV), have higher growth opportunities (MrB), are more profitable (ROA), have higher 
leverage (Leverage) , have lower beginning balance of net operating assets (NOA), and are 
more likely to hire Big4 auditors (Big4). With respect to earnings management, 
clawback-adopters engage less in accrual-based (Abs_DA) but more in real earnings 
management (RM) than non-adopters.10 
Panel B of Table 2 compares firms' characteristics for clawback-adopters in the 
pre- and post-adoption periods. In the post-adoption period, clawback-adopters become 
larger (logAssets and logMV), have lower growth opportunities (MrB) , and are less likely 
to hire Big4 as the auditors (Big4). However, profitability (ROA), leverage (Leverage), 
and the beginning balance of net operating assets (NOA) in clawback-adopters are not 
statistically different between the pre- and post-adoption periods. With respect to 
earnings management, in the post-adoption period, clawback-adopters have lower 
abnormal accruals (Abs _DA), but do not exhibit a significant change in real activities 
manipulation (RM). 
[TABLE 2] 
1° Comparing to the summary statistics in Chan et al. (2012b), I fmd the trends are roughly the same, 
except for the real earnings management proxy: the mean value of RM in Chan et al. (20 12b) is much 
higher than this study. The difference is primarily driven by abnormal discretionary expenses: 
clawback-adopters and non-adopters have abnormal discretionary expenses of 0.007 and 0.032, 
respectively, in this study; and 0.232 and 0.232, respectively, in Chan et al. (2012b). The mean value of 
abnormal discretionary expenses in this study is similar to those in prior literature (e.g., Cohen et al. 
2008; Zang 2012). By defmition, abnormal discretionary expense should be close to zero as they are 
residuals from Equation (4). There are several possible reasons for the differences. First, our sample 
periods are different. Second, Chan et al. (2012b) estimates Disexp;r/Asset;t-1 = ao + al(l /Asset;1_ 1) + 
azSale;r/Asset;r-1 + e;r to obtain abnormal discretionary expenses, while I replace sales with lagged sales 
as suggested by Roychowdhury (2006). Including current sales in the estimation model creates a 
problem iffmns manage sales upward to report higher earnings, resulting in a very low residual. 
However, my results do not change ifl estimate abnormal discretionary expenses using the equation 
above. Third, my data are winsorized at 1% and 99% by year to avoid outliers (consistent with Cohen et 
al. 2008 ; Zang 2012), but they do not mention winsorizing or trimming data in their paper. 
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5. Empirical Results: The Effect of Clawback Adoption on Earnings Management 
To test whether clawbacks change firms' earnings management behavior (H 1 and 
H2), I estimate Equation (1 ). I use four alternate measures of earnings management as the 
dependent variable: (1) the absolute value of discretionary accruals (Abs _ DA); (2) 
income-increasing accruals (Pos_DA); (3) income-decreasing accruals (Neg_DA); and (4) 
real earnings management proxy (RM). 
Column (1) of Table 3 presents the regression results using Abs DA . The 
experimental variable is Clawafter. Consistent with expectations, the estimated value of 
a2 is -0.013 (!-statistic= -6.50), indicating that 'relative to non-adopters, clawback-
adopters have lower absolute discretionary accruals in the post-adoption period compared 
to the pre-adoption period. Among control variables, ROA ( -0.167, !-statistic = -6.34 ), 
NOA (-0.011, !-statistic= -6.80) and Big4 (-0.012, !-statistic= -3.28) are significantly 
negative; MTB (0.003, !-statistic= 7.69) is significantly positive. 
Next, I estimate Equation (1) separately for two subsamples. I sort the firm-year 
observations into two groups based on the sign of discretionary accruals. Columns (2) 
and (3) present the results when the dependent variable is positive and negative 
discretionary accruals, respectively. 11 When the dependent variable is Pas_ DA, the 
estimated value of a2 is significantly negative (Clawafter coefficient= -0.045, !-statistic 
= -2.10); this suggests that compared to control firms, clawback-adopters experience a 
reduction in income-increasing discretionary accruals subsequent to the adoption of 
clawbacks. When the dependent variable is Neg_DA, a2 is significantly positive (0.120, t-
11 Since positive and negative discretionary accruals are truncated at zero, I use truncated 
regression to avoid biased estimates. 
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statistic= 4.17); this indicates that clawback-adopters also have less income-decreasing 
accruals subsequent to the adoption of clawbacks, relative to non-adopters. 12 Overall, 
these results support the prediction that clawbacks deter accrual-based earnings 
management after the implementation of clawback provisions (H1). 
To test whether clawbacks lead to changes in real activities manipulation (H2), I 
estimate Equation (1) with real earnings management proxy, RM, as the dependent 
variable. The estimated coefficient on Clawafter (a2) is significantly negative (-0.027, t-
statistic= -1.95), indicating that, relative to non-adopting firms, the level of real 
activities manipulation is reduced for clawback-adopting firms subsequent to the 
implementation of clawbacks, supporting the "signaling" argument of Hzs, and 
inconsistent with the substitution argument of HzA. 
Taken together, the results in Table 3 are consistent with clawback adoption 
discouraging earnings management through either accrual-based or real earnings 
management. 
[TABLE 3] 
6. Sensitivity Tests and Robustness Checks 
6.1 Potentially Endogeniety of Voluntary Clawback Decision 
To the extent that firms' characteristics and incentives differ across my sample, 
there could be systematic differences between the clawback-adopter and non-adopter 
12 Note that the predicted sign on Clawafter differs across column (2) and (3); that is, the 
expected negative (positive) coefficient for positive accruals in column (2) (negative accruals 
in column (3)) both suggest a reduction in earnings management behavior. 
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flrms. That is, the treatment effect could be correlated with the error term because the 
decision to adopt claw back is determined by flrms' characteristics and incentives that 
enter the error term. To mitigate this potential confound, I conduct a battery of robustness 
tests. First, I use propensity score matching to identify a group of control firms having the 
closest match of characteristics and incentives as clawback-adopters, but do not 
implement clawback provisions, and then use this matched sample to perform the 
difference-in-difference analysis. Second, I repeat the above process but use size to 
identify the control firms. Last, I conduct the Heckman two-stage procedures to control 
for selection bias. 
6.1.1 Propensity Score Matching and Difference-In-Difference Analysis 
Following prior studies (e.g., Chan et al. 2012a, Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2012), I 
first estimate a logit regression model to derive the predicted propensity of clawback 
adoption, and then match clawback-adopters with their closest non-adopter counterparts. 
Prior studies identify a number of variables associated with the likelihood of adopting 
clawbacks. Following this literature, I include the following variables in a logit regression 
examining the firm' s decision to adopt a clawback provision: prior restatements 
(Restatement), CEO duality (Dual), firm size (logMV), market-to-book ratio (MTB), and 
Leverage. Panel A of Table 4 reports that the decision to adopt clawback is positively 
associated with CEO duality (Dual) , size (logMV), and leverage; and negatively 
associated with growth opportunities (MTB). 
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After obtaining the propensity of clawback adoption, I then match each treatment 
firm with the control firm that has the closest probability in the same year and industry 
when the treatment firm adopts clawback within a caliper ofO.Ol from the treatment 
firm's propensity of adoption. I am able to identify 259 pairs of clawback-adopters and 
non-adopters. Panels Band C of Table 4 compare firms' characteristics for treatment and 
control firms in the pre- and post-adoption periods. Except for market-to-book ratio 
(MTB) in the post-adoption period, I fail to find any significant difference in firms' 
characteristics between the treatment and control firms in the pre- and post-adoption 
periods, suggesting my sample consists of good matches. 
To confirm whether clawbacks deter earnings management, I estimate the 
following difference-in-difference regression: 
EMu= (o + (1Clawu + (2Afteru + (JClawu*Afteru 
+ (4logMVu + (5MTBu + (6R0Au + (7Leverageu + (sNOAu + (9Big4u +xu 
(5) 
where EM is the earnings management proxies as defined earlier; Claw equals one if the 
company has adopted clawback provisions; After is a dummy variable that identifies the 
post-adoption period; for control firms, After equals one if their matched counterparts 
(clawback-adopters) are in the post-adoption period; and all control variables are as 
previously defined. (I represents the differences between the clawback-adopters and non-
adopters in the pre-adoption period. (2 captures aggregate factors that result in changes in 
EM for the non-adopters across the pre- and post-adoption periods. (3 is the coefficient of 
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interest, which measures the difference-in-difference in EM after the adoption of 
clawbacks between clawback-adopters and non-adopters. 
Panel D ofTable 4 presents the results from estimating Equation (5). The results 
are similar to Table 3. Specifically, Claw*After (i.e., (3), is significant for all accrual-
based earnings management proxies, and for the real earnings management proxy (RM). 
In the post-adoption period, managers decrease both income-increasing and income-
decreasing discretionary accruals, resulting in a decrease in the absolute value of accruals. 
As previously, I fail to find a substitution effect in earnings management, i.e., the 
reduction in accrual-based earnings management does not lead to an increase in real 
earnings management. Rather, the level of real activities manipulation also decreases 
after the introduction of clawbacks, consistent with the signaling effect. 
[TABLE 4] 
6.1. 2 Size Matching and Difference-In-Difference Analysis · 
In the second robustness test, I first match each treatment firm with the control 
firm that has the closest size (logMV) in the same year and industry when the treatment 
firm adopts clawback. I am able to identify 421 pairs of clawback-adopters and non-
adopters. Panels A and B of Table 5 reveal that all variables, including prior restatement 
(Restatement), CEO duality (Dual), firm size (logMV), market-to-book ratio (MTB), are 
not significantly different in means and medians between the treatment and control firms 
in the pre- and post-adoption periods, again suggesting my sample consists of high-
quality matches. 
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Panel C of Table 5 presents the regression results using the size-matched sample. 
The results are similar to those in Tables 3 and Table 4, with Claw*After again significant 
across all earnings management proxies. This provides further support that in the post-
adoption period, both accrual and real earnings management decreases. 
[TABLE 5] 
6.1.3 Heckman Two-Stage Analysis 
In the third robustness test, I first estimate the probit model that explains that 
decision to adopt clawback provisions. I use the same independent variables that are 
included in the propensity-score logit model discussed previously. Panel A of Table 6 
reports that the decision to adopt clawback is positively associated with CEO duality 
(Dual), size (logMV),) and leverage; and negatively associated with growth opportunities 
(MTB) and profitability (ROA). 
I then estimate the following regression, applied to clawback-adopters only: 
EMit = 710 + 1J JClawafteru 
+ rplogMVit + 1JJMTBu + 1]4ROAu + 715Leverageit + 1J6N0Ait + 1J7Big4it 
+ 1]sMillsit + industy; + yeart + If/it (6) 
where EM and the independent variables are as defined earlier; and Mills is constructed 
from clawback decision model in the Heckman first-stage procedure to control for 
selection bias. Industry and year-fixed effects are added to control for heterogeneity that 
is constant across industry and time. Because the positive (negative) discretionary accrual 
subsample tests in Table 3 are estimated using firm-years that report positive (negative) 
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discretionary accruals, the first-stage probit model that requires a full sample cannot be 
estimated. Thus, I only report results from estimating Equation (6) when the absolute 
value of accruals (Abs _ DA) and real earnings management proxy (RM) are the dependent 
variables. 
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results from estimating Equation (6). Similar to 
previous findings, the coefficient of interest, Clawafter (i.e., 1J 1 ), is marginally significant 
for accrual-based proxy (Abs _ DA) and significant for the real earnings management 
proxy (RM), suggesting that in the post-adoption period, clawback-adopters exhibit a 
reduction in earnings management. 
Overall, these results are robust to a number of alternative specifications. My 
findings suggest that after the adoption of clawback provisions, firms decrease both 
accrual-based and real earnings management, indicating clawback provisions lead to an 
improvement in reporting quality. I fail to document an unintended consequence of 
clawback provisions, i.e., managers do not switch from accrual-based earnings 
management to real earnings management. 
[TABLE 6] 
6.2 Subsample Analyses: The Effect ofClawback Adoption on Earnings Management 
under High Incentive Settings 
In this section, I investigate whether the effectiveness of clawback provisions 
varies according to incentives to manipulate earnings. I identify two situations, in which 
managers have higher incentives to engage in earnings manipulation: (1) when firms 
conduct seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in the following period; and (2) when firms 
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just meet/beat earnings benchmarks. Prior studies find both situations reflect capital 
market incentives that are key factors influencing earnings management behavior (Teoh 
et al. 1998; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Degeorge et al. 1999; Graham et al. 2005; 
Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Accordingly, I 
estimate Equation (1) on these two high-incentive subsamples. The advantage of doing so 
is that earnings management behavior will likely be more homogeneous across firm-years, 
and thus yield a potentially "cleaner" test of the effectiveness of clawbacks. 
The first subsample contains firm-year observations that issue seasoned equity in 
year t+ 1, and the second subsample contains firm-year observations that just meet/beat 
earnings benchmarks. Following prior research (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; 
Zang 20 12), I categorize a firm-year observation as just meet/beat earnings benchmarks if 
one ofthe following conditions holds: (1) earnings before extraordinary items scaled by 
lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.005; (2) the change in earnings before 
extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets is between 0.005; or (3) actual EPS 
minus the latest analyst consensus forecast is between 0 and 0.01. The coefficient on 
Clawafter, a2, measures variation in the earnings management proxy of interest between 
clawback-adopters and non-adopters under high incentive situations; a positive (negative) 
coefficient suggests relative to non-adopters, clawback-adopters engage in more (less) 
earnings management when the incentives to manipulate are high. 
With respect to accrual earnings management, I predict that clawbacks may 
remain effective when a manager has more benefits from engaging in earnings 
manipulation. This is because the accompanying increase in cost of earnings management 
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from the clawback provisions may also be high. For example, assume that a manager in a 
company with clawbacks wants to use accrual-based earnings management to beat 
earnings targets. Ifhe inflates earnings through accruals, he will receive the benefits.of 
reaching targets (e.g., secure his job and higher compensation (Matsunaga and Park 2001; 
Mergenthaler et al. 2012)). However, he bears more costs resulting from his action by 
increasing the recoupable amount (the difference between the inflated compensation and 
that he otherwise should have earned). Fearing that clawbacks provide managers with 
"more to lose" if found "cheating", managers should be less willing to engage in accrual 
earnings management even though doing so yields more benefits. On the other hand, the 
"signal of commitment" argument also predicts a decrease in accrual-based earnings 
management under high incentive settings. To the extent that board of directors exert 
higher efforts monitoring managers even under higher capital market incentives, accrual-
based earnings management should decrease. 
The subsample tests with real earnings management proxy (RM) as the dependent 
variable provide additional support to tease out whether a "substitution" or "signaling" 
effect contributes to the changes in earnings management. A decrease in real earnings 
management under higher capital market pressure would suggest that the "signaling" 
effect leads to an improvement in reporting quality. This is because under higher 
incentive settings, a manager under clawbacks should choose real earnings management 
to inflate earnings as the ability to engage in accrual earnings management is more 
constrained; however, as board of directors show new commitment to improve reporting 
quality, he is unwilling to engage in real activities manipulation. 
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6. 2.1 Empirical Results: Seasoned Equity Subs ample 
Panel A of Table 7 compares firms' characteristics for treatment and control firms 
in the SEQ subsample. Compared to non-adopters, clawback-adopters are larger 
(logAssets and logMV), have lower beginning balance of net operating assets (NOA), and 
are more likely to hire Big4 auditors (Big4). With respect to earnings management, 
clawback-adopters engage less in accrual-based (Abs_DA) but more in real earnings 
management (RM) than non-adopters. 
Panel B of Table 7 compares firms' characteristics for clawback-adopters in the 
pre- and post-adoption periods. In the post-adoption period, clawback-adopters have 
lower growth opportunities (MTB), and are less likely to hire Big4 as the auditors (Big4). 
With respect to earnings management, in the post-adoption period, clawback-adopters 
have lower abnormal accruals (Abs DA), and also exhibit a reduction in real activities 
manipulation (RM). 
Panel C of Table 7 presents the regression results using the subsample of firm-
years that conduct seasoned equity offerings in the next fiscal year. The coefficient on the 
experimental variable of Clawafter is significant for the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (-0.028, t-statistic = -2.79) and significant for the negative discretionary 
accruals (0.592, t-statistic = 1.63). The results indicate that clawback-adopters that 
conduct a seasoned equity offering in the next fiscal year exhibit a reduction in the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals, and the reduction is primarily driven by the 
reduction in negative discretionary accruals. This suggests that clawback provisions 
remain effective in deterring accrual-based earnings management even when managers 
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have more incentives to inflate earnings. With respect to real earnings management, the 
coefficient on Clawafter ( -0.132, t-statistic = -2.02) is significantly negative, suggesting 
that the level of real activities manipulation decreases for the clawback-adopters in the 
post-adoption period. This fmding supports that board of directors in clawback-adopters 
monitor managers closely, thereby decreasing real earnings management. 
[TABLE 7] 
6. 2. 2 Empirical Results: Just Meeting/Beating Earnings Benchmarks Subs ample 
Panel A of Table 8 reports descriptive statistics for clawback-adopters and non-
adopters in the Just meet/beat subsample. Compared to non-adopters, clawback-adopters 
in the Just meet/beat subsample are larger (logAssets and logMV), have higher growth 
opportunities (MTB), are more profitable (ROA), have higher leverage (Leverage), and 
are more likely to hire Big4 auditors (Big4). With respect to earnings management, 
clawback-adopters engage less in accrual-based (Abs_DA) but more in real earnings 
management (RM) than non-adopters 
Panel B of Table 8 compares firms' characteristics for clawback-adopters in the 
Just meet/beat subsample in the pre- and post-adoption periods. In the post-adoption 
period, clawback-adopters become larger (logAssets and logMV), and are less likely to 
hire Big4 as the auditors (Big4). All other firms' characteristics, including growth 
opportunities (MTB), profitability (ROA), leverage (Leverage), and the beginning balance 
of net operating assets (NOA), are not statistically different between the pre- and post-
adoption period. With respect to earnings management, in the post-adoption period, 
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clawback-adopters in the Just meet/beat subsample have lower abnormal accruals 
(Abs _ DA), but do not exhibit a significant change in real activities manipulation (RM). 
Panel C of Table 8 examines the same relation for the subsample of firm-years 
that just meet/beat earnings targets. The predictions follow those from the subsample 
analysis of seasoned equity offerings. When the dependent variable is the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals, the coefficient on Clawafter (a2) takes the expected signs 
(Abs_DA: -0.008, t-statistic = -2.44), indicating that for firms just meeting/beating 
earnings benchmarks, clawback-adopters experience a larger reduction in discretionary 
accruals relative to non-adopters. This finding supports the argument that clawbacks 
increase the costs of accrual-based earnings management, and managers under clawbacks 
are more cautious in using accruals. Even when managers are under the pressure to avoid 
missing earnings targets, clawback-adopters reduce accrual manipulation. However, 
when the dependent variable is positive discretionary accruals or negative discretionary 
accruals, a2 attains the expected negative and positive predicted signs, but is insignificant 
(Pos_DA: -0.027, t-statistic = -0.99; Neg_DA: 0.761, t-statistic = 1.12). With respect to 
real earnings management, a2 (-0.001, t-statistic = -0.02) is again insignificant, 
suggesting that the level of real activities manipulation does not change for the clawback-
adopters in the post-adoption period. 
Taken together, the results in Table 8 provide some support for H1, examining 
whether clawback provisions are effective in deterring accrual-based earnings 
management in high incentive settings. Specifically, when the managers in clawback-
adopting companies face more incentives to manipulate earnings through accruals, 
31 
clawbacks provide a strong governance mechanism resulting in a reduction in abnormal 
accruals. On the other hand, I only find the level of real earnings management changes 
when managers are under more pressure to manipulate earnings under the seasoned 
equity offering setting, consistent with a signaling effect. 
[TABLE 8] 
6. 3 Alternate Control Variable 
This section examines whether clawback adoption merely signals firms' existing 
quality of corporate governance. If only firms with high quality corporate governance 
adopt clawbacks, then the changes in dependent variables reported in Table 3 may be 
driven by already high-quality firms. I address this issue by adding CEO duality (Dual), 
which proxies for the quality of corporate governance mechanism, to Equation (1 ). Table 
9 presents this sensitivity analysis. The experimental variable, Clawafter, remains 
significant for all earnings management proxies, suggesting that the changes in earnings 
management reported in Table 2 are not driven by existing corporate governance 
measures. In addition, if high-quality firms use claw back adoption as a signal to 
differentiate themselves from peer firms, such signal does not necessarily imply a change 
in managers' behavior. In fact, high-quality firms have lower risks of restatements, 
managers may not find clawback provisions a credible threat, and thus earnings 
manipulation will not change accordingly. 
[TABLE 9] 
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6. 4 Alternate Definition for Post-Adoption Period 
Finally, I assign 2008 as the adoption year to the non-adopting firms to 
incorporate the difference-in-difference analysis using the full sample, because, as 
presented in Panel C of Table 3, there is a sufficient number of adopters around 2008. 
After is the indicator variable that identifies the post-adoption period for both treatment 
and control groups. Table 10 presents the results from estimating Equation (5). The 
coefficient of interest, Claw*After (i.e., (3), remains significant for all accrual-based 
earnings management proxies, and for the real earnings management proxy (RM). Overall, 
the results are consistent with the results of difference-in-difference analysis, applied to 
the propensity score matched sample, and size matched sample. 
[TABLE 10] 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines whether voluntary claw back provisions change earnings 
management behavior. Using S&P1500 firms over 2000-2011, I find that, relative to non-
adopters, clawback-adopters experience a reduction in both accrual-based and real 
earnings management in the post-adoption period, suggesting that clawbacks deter 
managers' opportunistic behavior. These findings are consistent with clawback adoption 
signaling a commitment to higher quality reporting, and are inconsistent with a 
substitution effect that leads a decrease in accrual-based and increase in real earnings 
management following adoption. 
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As the earnings management proxies may be correlated with the decision to adopt 
clawback, I conduct various robustness tests. My results are robust to alternate research 
designs, including difference-in-difference analysis using propensity score matched or 
size matched samples, and Heckman two-stage analysis. I also examine whether the 
results are consistent when managers have more incentives to inflate earnings. I find that 
clawback-adopters experience a reduction in both accrual and real earnings management 
when they have a seasoned equity offering in the following year; and exhibit a decrease 
in accrual earnings management when they just meet/beat earnings benchmarks, 
suggesting clawback adoption could serve as a signal of commitment to improve 
reporting quality. 
These findings are important to the capital markets and regulators, as they reveal 
that clawback provisions can serve to signal a commitment to improved reporting quality. 
In additional, these findings relieve the concerns that clawback provisions would result in 
unintended consequences (e.g., an increase in real transaction manipulation). Finally, this 
study further contributes to the corporate governance literature by linking clawback 
provisions and improvement in earnings quality. 
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Variable 
Abs DAa 
Accruals 
A_Disexpa 
After 
A Procf 
Assets 
Big4 
Claw 
Clawafter 
Disexp 
Dual 
Leveragea 
LogAssets 
LogMP 
MTBa 
Neg_DAa 
NOA($) 
Pos DAa 
PPF]l 
APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
Variable description 
The absolute value of discretionary accruals computed using the 
Modified Jones Model. 
Earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus 
operating cash flows from the statement of cash flows. 
Abnormal discretionary expense, measured as the residual of Equation 
(4) times -1. 
Indicator variable that equals one if the clawback-adopters are in the 
post-adoption period, or for control firms, if their matched counterparts 
(clawback-adopters) are in the post adoption period. 
Abnormal production cost, measured as the residual of Equation (3). 
Total assets. 
Indicator variable that equals one if the company is audited by one of 
the Big 4, and zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable that equals one if the company adopts a clawback 
provision, and zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable that equals one if firm-years in which clawback-
adopters have clawback provisions in place, and zero otherwise 
Discretionary expense, calculated as the sum of SG&A, R&D and 
advertising expenses. 
Indicator variable that equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board. 
Leverage, calculated as total debt divided by total assets. 
Logarithm of firm's total assets. 
Logarithm of firm's market capitalization. 
Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of equity divided by 
book value of equity. 
The value of negative discretionary accruals computed using the 
Modified Jones Model. 
Net operating assets is the difference between operating assets and 
operating liabilities. Operating assets is calculated as total assets less 
cash and short-term investment. Operating liabilities is calculated as 
total assets less total debt, less book value of common and preferred 
equity, less minority interest. 
Indicator variable that equals one if the lagged net operating assets 
scaled by sales in year t-1 is above the mean of the corresponding 
industry-year. Net operating assets is defined in NOA ($). 
The value of positive discretionary accruals computed using the 
Modified Jones Model. 
Gross property, plant and equipment. 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
Restatement Indicator variable that equals one if the firm's financial statements are 
restated in the past two years. 
ROAa Return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets in year t-1. 
Sales Total sales. 
Notes: 
a These variables are defined as the difference from the industry-year mean in 
Equations (1) and (5). 
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Panel A: Sample selection 
TABLE 1 
Sample 
Initial sample from Compustat 2000-2011 
Exclude: 
Firms in financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated 
industries (SIC 4400-4999) 
Firm-years that change fiscal year end 
Firm-years with missing value to estimate earnings management proxy 
Firm-years with missing value on control variables 
Industry-year combinations with less than 15 observations 
Firms not in S&P1500 
Clawback-adopters without observations in the pre- and post-adoption 
period 
Final sample 
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Number of 
Observations 
112,904 
(37,963) 
(5,245) 
(16,472) 
(9,355) 
(1 ,437) 
(27,428) 
(181) 
14,823 
w 
Panel B: Industry distribution 
Industry 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Mining 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Wholesale trade 
Retai I trade 
Services 
Other 
TABLE 1 (continued) 
Number offrrms with 
Number of frrms 
without clawback 
%of the 425 frrms 
with clawback 
SIC two-digit codes clawback provisions provisions provisions 
01-09 0 2 0.0 % 
10-14 18 71 4.2 
15-17 8 18 1.9 
20-39 255 685 60.0 
50-51 28 46 6.6 
52-59 53 128 12.5 
70-88 61 286 14.4 
99 2 8 0.5 
oo Total 425 1,244 100.0 % 
Panel C: Yearly distribution 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Control group 968 963 961 963 950 912 853 791 752 729 694 662 10,198 
Clawback-Pre 353 362 369 376 386 386 383 318 265 198 90 0 3,486 
Clawback-Post 0 0 0 0 0 6 9 80 137 206 315 386 1,139 
Total 1,321 1,325 1,330 1,339 1,336 1,304 1,245 1,189 1,154 1,133 1,099 1,048 14,823 
Notes: 
Panel A presents the sample selection, Panel B the industry distribution, and Panel C the yearly distribution. In Panel C, 
Clawback-Pre (Clawback-Post) represents the number of firm-year observations for the clawback adopters in the pre-adoption 
(post-adoption) period. 
TABLE2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Full sample 
Mean Median 
Non- Non-
Clawback Clawback Clawback Clawback 
Variable firms firms Diff. t-stat firms firms Diff. z-stat 
Abs DA 0.058 0.049 
-7.73 *** 0.038 0.033 -7.36 *** 
-
A_Disexp 0.007 0.032 6.70 *** 0.034 0.047 5.35 *** 
A Prod -0.028 -0.014 4.12 *** -0.017 -0.003 4.58 *** 
RM -0.021 0.018 5.87 *** 0.020 0.051 5.71 *** 
logAssets 6.689 7.858 42.96 *** 6.593 7.708 40.63 *** 
V..l logMV 6.809 7.911 39.10 *** 6.743 7.799 36.79 *** 
\0 MTB 3.010 3.222 4.11 *** 2.172 2.420 8.72 *** 
ROA 0.046 0.061 6.99 *** 0.057 0.065 6.86 *** 
Leverage 0.193 0.222 8.73 *** 0.156 0.200 12.49 *** 
NOA ($) 0.718 0.649 
-5.14 *** 0.544 0.507 -4.47 *** 
Big4 0.916 0.969 14.18 *** 1.000 1.000 11.95 *** 
~ 
0 
TABLE 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Clawback-adopters 
Mean Median 
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
adoption adoption adoption adoption 
Variable 2eriod period Diff. t-stat period period Diff. z-stat 
Abs DA 0.052 0.042 -5.54 *** 0.034 0.030 -3.89 *** 
A_Disexp 0.035 0.022 -1.93 * 0.051 0.036 -2.99 *** 
A Prod -0.013 -0.018 -0.77 0.000 -0.013 -1.62 
RM 0.022 0.005 -1.46 0.057 0.035 -2.56 ** 
logAssets 7.719 8.285 10.32 *** 7.587 8.142 9.96 *** 
logMV 7.820 8.187 6.51 *** 7.701 8.095 6.15 *** 
MTB 3.332 2.887 -4.85 *** 2.517 2.254 -5.42 *** 
ROA 0.061 0.061 0.09 0.065 0.065 -0.47 
Leverage 0.222 0.220 -0.36 0.201 0.200 0.53 
NOA ($) 0.653 0.635 -0.92 0.507 0.508 0.03 
Big4 0.974 0.954 -2.90 *** 1 1 -3.31 *** 
Notes: 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample (clawback-adopters and non-adopters). Panel B presents the 
descriptive statistics for the clawback-adopters in the pre- and post-adoption period. The sample includes S&P1500 firms over 
2000-2011 having necessary data. ***,**,and* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, 
based on t-statistics for difference in means or z-statistics for difference in medians. Appendix A provides variable definitions. 
~ 
...... 
TABLE3 
The Effect of Clawback Adoption on Earnings Management 
(1) Abs DA (HI) (2) Pos DA (HI) (3) Neg DA (HI) (4) RM(H2) 
Pre d. Pre d. Pre d. Pred. 
Variable sign Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. t-stat sig_n Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.083 20.74 *** -0.326 -8.06 *** 0.235 7.77 *** -0.079 - 2.12 ** 
Experimental 
variables: 
Claw ? -0.005 -2.71 *** ? -0.003 -0.25 ? 0.015 1.06 ? 0.020 1.05 
Claw after - -0.013 
-6.50 *** - -0.045 -2.10 ** + 0.120 4.17 *** +I- -0.027 -1.95 * 
Control 
variables: 
logMV ? 0.000 -0.01 ? -0.046 
- 9.74 *** ? 0.006 1.60 ? 0.033 4.88 *** 
MrB ? 0.003 7.69 *** ? -0.001 -0.43 ? -0.014 -9.38 *** ? -0.045 -12.61 *** 
ROA ? -0.167 
-6.34 *** + 1.226 13.11 *** + 0.993 28.89 *** ? -0.113 -1.56 
Leverage ? --0.005 -0.89 + 0.068 2.76 *** + 0.014 0.51 + 0.303 8.48 *** 
NOA ? --0.011 
-6.80 *** - -0.065 -5.10 *** ? 0.028 2.27 ** + 0.025 2.05 ** 
Big4 - --0.012 
-3.28 *** - 0.005 0.31 + 0.050 2.35 *** + 0.022 0.61 
Adj-R2 0.106 N/A NIA 0.133 
N 14,823 8,332 6,491 14,823 
Notes: 
This table presents results on the effect of clawback adoption on earnings management using the following regression: 
EMu = ao + a1Clawu + a2Clawajteru + a3logMVu + a4MTBu + a5ROAu + a6Leverageu + a7NOAu + a8Big4u + eu 
The sample contains 14,823 firm-year observations over 2000 to 2011. * * *, * *, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests of significance for variables with (without) a 
directional prediction. The t-statistics in column (1) and (4) are calculated using robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
firm level. Appendix A provides variable definitions. The dependent variable is EM, alternatively defined as: absolute 
discretionary accruals (Abs _ DA) in column (1 ); positive discretionary accruals (Pos _ DA) in column (2); negative discretionary 
accruals (Neg_DA) in column (3); and real activities manipulation (RM) in column (4). Truncated regressions are used when 
+:o 
N 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
the dependent variables are positive and negative discretionary accruals in column (2) and (3), respectively, and thus Adj-R2 is 
not available. 
TABLE4 
Propensity Score Matching and Difference-In-Difference Analysis: 
The Effect of Clawback Adoption on Earnings Management 
Panel A: Propensity-score matching logit model 
Pre d. 
Variable sign 
Intercept 
Restatement + 
Dual ? 
logMV + 
MTB ? 
ROA ? 
Leverage ? 
Pseudo R2 
N 
43 
Coeff. 
--4.402 
-0.043 
0.109 
0.489 
-0.047 
-0.214 
0.794 
0.105 
13,281 
Wald 
Chi-Square 
1657.55 *** 
0.41 
7.33 *** 
. 1118.77 *** 
54.69 *** 
1.50 
39.94 *** 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
Panel B: Firms' characteristics of treatment and control samples prior to adoption 
Mean Median 
Non- Non-
Clawback Clawback Clawback Clawback 
Variable firms firms Diff. t-stat firms firms Diff. z-stat 
Restatement 0.116 0.097 -0.71 0 0 -0.71 
Dual 0.537 0.521 -0.35 1 1 -0.35 
logMV 7.674 7.660 -0.12 7.555 7.593 -0.01 
MTB 3.387 3.005 -1.58 2.475 2.294 -1.13 
ROA 0.052 0.055 0.27 0.058 0.063 0.51 
Leverage 0.184 0.179 -0.42 0.164 0.160 -0.20 
+:-. 
+:-. 
Panel C: Firms' characteristics of treatment and control samples after adoption 
Mean Median 
Non- Non-
Clawback Clawback Clawback Clawback 
Variable firms firms Diff. t-stat firms firms Diff. z-stat 
Restatement 0.054 0.068 0.65 0 0 -0.65 
Dual 0.536 0.518 -0.40 1 1 -0.40 
logMV 7.693 7.637 -0.48 7.595 7.593 -0.41 
MTB 3.304 2.762 -2.17 ** 2.334 2.294 -1.50 
ROA 0.074 0.068 -0.75 0.075 0.063 -0.82 
Leverage 0.202 0.190 -0.81 0.177 0.160 -0.05 
~ 
VI 
Panel D: Difference-in-difference analysis 
(l)Abs_DA (HI) 
Pred. 
Variable sign Coeff. !-stat 
Intercept 0.082 10.48 *** 
Experimental 
variables: 
Claw ? --0.003 --0.75 
After ? --0.011 
-3 .18 *** 
Claw*After - --0.009 -2.12 ** 
Control 
variables: 
logMV ? 0.004 1.87 * 
MTB ? 0.004 5.89 *** 
ROA ? --0.273 -4.91 *** 
Leverage ? --0.008 --0.86 
NOA ? --0.012 
-3.86 *** 
Big4 - --0.007 -1.09 
Adj-R2 0.218 
N 5,564 
Pre d. 
sign 
? 
? 
-
? 
? 
+ 
+ 
-
-
TABLE 4 (continued) 
(2) Pos _ DA (HI) (3) Neg_DA (HI) (4) RM(H2) 
Pre d. Pre d. 
Coeff. !-stat sign Coeff. !-stat sign Coeff. !-stat 
--0.363 
-4.48 *** 0.164 3.77 *** --0.092 -1.85 * 
0.043 2.53 ** ? 0.030 2.03 ** ? 0.013 0.41 
0.011 0.42 ? 0.039 1.75 * ? 0.014 0.87 
--0.094 
-2.34 *** + 0.067 1.86 ** +I- --0.051 -2.00 ** 
--0.038 
-4.89 *** ? --0.005 -1.11 ? 0.013 1.25 
--0.003 --0.90 ? --0.016 - 9.59 *** ? --0.042 -7.70 *** 
1.225 7.08 *** + 0.913 25.45 *** ? 0.024 0.25 
0.151 3.33 *** + 0.002 0.07 + 0.267 4.75 *** 
--0.049 
- 2.49 *** ? 0.036 2.38 ** + 0.022 1.06 
--0.004 --0.12 + --0.005 --0.14 + 0.092 1.88 ** 
NIA NIA 0.132 
3,137 2,427 5,564 
-+:>. 
0\ 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
Notes: 
This table presents the robustness test from estimating the effect of clawback adoption on earnings management. The sample 
contains 5,564 firm-year observations, which represent 259 pairs of clawback-adopters and non-adopters based on propensity-
score matching over 2000 to 2011. Panel A examines the following propensity-score logit model: 
Clawu = Bo + BJRestatementu-I + B2Dualit-I + ()3/ogMVu-1 + ()4MFBu-1 + ()5ROAit-I + ()6Leverageit-I + P,it 
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the treatment and control firms (clawback-adopters and non-adopters) prior to 
adoption (t-1), and Panel C after adoption (t). Panel D examines regressions ofthe following form: 
EMu = (o + (IClawit + (2Afterit + (3Clawit*Ajterit + (4/ogMVu + (5MFBit + (6ROAit + (7Leverageit + (sNOAit + (9Big4it 
+xu 
* * *, * *, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, based on t-statistics for difference in means or z-
statistics for difference in medians in Panel B and Panel C, and one-tailed (two-tailed) tests of significance for variables with 
(without) a directional prediction in Panel A and Panel D. The t-statistics in column (1) and (4) of Panel Dare calculated using 
robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. Appendix A provides variable definitions. The dependent variable is 
EM, alternatively defined as: absolute discretionary accruals (Abs_DA) in column (1); positive discretionary accruals (Pos_DA) 
in column (2); negative discretionary accruals (Neg_DA) in column (3); and real activities manipulation (RM) in column (4). 
Truncated regressions are used when the dependent variables are positive and negative discretionary accruals in column (2) 
and (3), respectively, and thus Adj-R2 is not available. 
TABLES 
Size Matching and Difference-In-Difference Analysis: 
The Effect of Clawback Adoption on Earnings Management 
Panel A: Firms' characteristics of treatment and control samples prior to adoption 
Mean Median 
Non- Non-
Clawback Clawback Clawback Clawback 
Variable firms firms Diff. t-stat firms firms Diff. z-stat 
Restatement 0.086 0.093 0.36 0 0 0.36 
Dual 0.512 0.556 1.28 1 1 -1.28 
logMV 7.902 8.014 1.08 7.777 7.848 0.87 
MTB 3.361 3.082 -1.34 2.372 2.363 -0.60 
~ ROA 0.057 0.049 -1.15 0.063 0.062 -0.71 
-....} Leverage 0.185 0.197 1.20 0.163 0.178 1.28 
Panel B: Firms' characteristics of treatment and control samples after adoption 
Mean Median 
Non- Non-
Clawback Clawback Clawback Clawback 
Variable firms firms Diff. t-stat firms firms Diff. z-stat 
Restatement 0.040 0.059 1.26 0 0 -1.26 
Dual 0.507 0.564 1.64 1 1 -1.64 
logMV 7.928 7.999 0.68 7.838 7.872 0.53 
MTB 3.126 2.889 -1.24 2.317 2.241 -1.21 
ROA 0.072 0.066 -0.98 0.068 0.068 -0.81 
Leverage 0.209 0.211 0.22 0.186 0.190 0.52 
~ 
00 
TABLE 5 (continued) 
Panel C: Difference-in-difference analysis 
(l)Abs_DA (H1) (2) Pos_DA (H1) (3) Neg_DA (H1) (4) RM(H2) 
Pre d. Pred. Pre d. Pre d. 
Variable sign Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. · t-stat sign Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.081 10.39 *** --0.426 -5.33 *** 0.155 4.53 *** --0.036 --0.69 
Experimental 
variables: 
Claw ? -0.001 --0.21 ? 0.032 2.14 ** ? --0.036 -2.66 *** ? --0.018 --0.69 
After ? -0.008 
-2.34 ** ? 0.015 0.69 ? 0.007 0.35 ? 0.011 0.79 
Claw*After - -0.007 -2.13 ** - --0.061 -1.90 ** + 0.085 2.94 *** +I- --0.035 -1.77 * 
Control 
variables: 
logMV ? 0.003 1.60 ? --0.045 
-6.36 *** ? 0.001 0.30 ? 0.021 2.54 ** 
MTB ? 0.003 4.97 *** ? --0.004 -1.70 * ? --0.015 -9.82 *** ? --0.032 -7.08 *** 
ROA ? -0.234 
-3.78 *** + 1.354 7.94 *** + 0.933 26.00 *** ? --0.095 -1.16 
Leverage ? 0.000 --0.06 + 0.167 4.07 *** + 0.087 2.82 *** + 0.277 4.86 *** 
NOA ? -0.009 
-3.97 *** - --0.059 -3 .25 *** ? 0.014 1.08 + --0.014 --0.69 
Big4 - -0.016 -2.81 *** - 0.029 0.98 + 0.085 3.23 *** + 0.046 0.91 
Adj-R2 0.175 N/A N/A 0.092 
N 9,091 5,108 3,983 9,091 
Notes: 
This table presents the robustness test from estimating the effect of clawback adoption on earnings management. The sample 
contains 9,091 firm-year observations, which represent 421 pairs of clawback-adopters and non-adopters based on size (logMV) 
over 2000 to 2011. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the treatment and control firms ( clawback -adopters and non-
adopters) prior to adoption (t-1), and Panel B after adoption (t). Panel C examines regressions of the following form: 
EMu= (o + (,C!awu + (2Ajteru + (3Clawu*Ajteru + (4/ogMVu + (5MTBu + (6R0Au + ( 7Leverageu + (sNOAu + (9Big4u 
+Xu 
+::-
\0 
TABLE 5 (continued) 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, based on t-statistics for difference in means or z-
statistics for difference in medians in Panel A and Panel B, and one-tailed (two-tailed) tests of significance for variables with 
(without) a directional prediction in Panel C. The t-statistics in column (1) and (4) of Panel Care calculated using robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. Appendix A provides variable definitions. The dependent variable is EM, 
alternatively defmed as: absolute discretionary accruals (Abs _DA) in column (1 ); positive discretionary accruals (Pos _ DA) in 
column (2); negative discretionary accruals (Neg_DA) in column (3); and real activities manipulation (RM) in column (4). 
Truncated regressions are used when the dependent variables are positive and negative discretionary accruals in column (2) 
and (3), respectively, and thus Adj-R2 is not available. 
TABLE6 
Heckman Two-Stage Analysis: 
The Effect of Clawback Adoption on Earnings Management 
Panel A: Heckman first-stage probit model 
Pre d. 
Variable stgn Coeff. z-stat 
Intercept -8.505 -35.67 *** 
Restatement + -0.030 -0.72 
Dual ? 0.067 2.71 *** 
logMV + 0.320 34.06 *** 
MTB ? -0.027 -5.68 *** 
ROA ? -0.338 -2.92 *** 
Leverage ? 0.261 3.80 *** 
Fixed effects Year/Industry Year/Industry 
N 13,281 
50 
TABLE 6 (continued) 
Panel B: Heckman second-stage 
(1) Abs DA (HI) (2) RM(H2) 
Pre d. Pred. 
Variable stgn Coeff. z-stat Sign Coeff. z-stat 
Intercept -0.125 -1.79 * -0.452 -1.08 
Experimental 
variable: 
Clawafter -0.004 -1.43 * +I- -0.039 -2.15 ** 
Control 
variables: 
MTB ? 0.002 4.30 *** ? -0.033 -11.04 *** 
ROA ? -0.257 -24.09 *** ? -0.505 -8.11 *** 
Leverage ? 0.007 0.99 + 0.318 7.95 *** 
NOA ? -0.002 -1.13 + 0.002 0.13 
Big4 -0.002 -0.39 + 0.083 2.74 *** 
Mills 0.052 2.56 ** 0.055 0.45 
Fixed effects Year/Industry Year/Industry 
N 13,281 13,281 
Notes: 
This table presents the robustness test from estimating the effect of clawback adoption on 
earnings management using the Heckman two-stage procedure. The sample contains 
13,281 firm-year observations over 2000 to 2011. Panel A examines the following first- . 
stage probit model: 
Pr(Clawu= 1) = zo + lJRestatementu-I + Z2Duali1-I + z 3logMVu + l4MTBil 
+ z 5ROAu + z 6Leverageit + industyi + yeart + Wit 
Panel B examines the second-stage regressions of the following form: 
EMit= rto + rtiClawafteru + 172logMVu + YfJMTBu + rt4ROAu + Yf5Leverageu 
+ Yf6N0Au + rt7Big4it + rtsMillsit + industyi + yeart + !flit 
***,**, and* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, 
based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests of significance for variables with (without) a 
directional prediction. The coefficients on year and industry dummy variables are not 
reported. Appendix A provides variable definitions. The dependent variable is EM, 
alternatively defined as: absolute discretionary accruals (Abs_DA) in column (1); and real 
activities manipulation in column (2). Due to data requirement for Heckman-two stage 
analysis, only the changes in absolute discretionary accruals (Abs_DA) and real activities 
manipulation (RM) are examined. 
51 
TABLE7 
The Effect of Clawback Adoption on Earnings Management under High Incentive Settings: 
Subsample of Firm-Year Observations That Issue Seasoned Equity in the Following Year 
Panel A: SEQ subsample (adopters vs. non-adopters) 
Mean Median 
Non- Non-
Clawback Clawback Clawback Clawback 
firms firms firms firms 
Variable (N=391) (N=119) Diff. t-stat (N=391) (N=119) Diff. z-stat 
Abs DA 0.069 0.053 
-2.28 ** 0.042 0.029 -1.58 
A_Disexp -0.003 0.051 2.50 ** 0.031 0.052 -1.62 
A Prod 0.000 0.021 1.24 -0.003 0.029 1.11 
Vl RM -0.003 0.071 2.19 ** 0.042 0.106 1.40 
N logAssets 6.551 7.716 6.63 *** 6.493 7.619 6.53 *** 
logMV 6.643 7.565 5.53 *** 6.430 7.354 5.45 *** 
MTB 3.278 3.203 -0.19 2.297 2.361 -0.54 
ROA 0.019 0.035 1.25 0.049 0.043 -0.04 
Leverage 0.273 0.284 0.49 0.256 0.261 0.74 
NOA ($) 0.920 0.732 
-2.48 ** 0.650 0.568 -0.94 
Big4 0.910 0.966 2.54 ** 1 1 2.01 ** 
TABLE 7 (continued) 
Panel B: Clawback adopters in the SEO subsample (pre- vs. post-) 
Mean Median 
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
adoption adoption adoption adoption 
period period period period 
Variable (N=98) (N=21) Diff. t-stat (N=98) (N=21) Diff. z-stat 
Abs DA 0.057 0.032 
-2.99 *** 0.029 0.027 -0.95 
A_Disexp 0.060 0.008 -1.20 0.056 0.012 1.22 
A Prod 0.033 -0.036 -1.93 * 0.044 -0.066 -2.43 ** 
RM 0.093 -0.029 -1.71 * 0.118 -0.049 -1.86 * 
logAssets 7.611 8.208 1.19 7.526 7.822 1.63 
logMV 7.540 7.684 0.28 7.303 7.926 0.64 
Vl 
w MTB 3.517 1.737 
-3.88 *** 2.733 1.686 -2.89 *** 
ROA 0.042 0.004 -1.49 0.043 0.047 -1.18 
Leverage 0.295 0.233 -1.61 0.274 0.243 -1.30 
NOA ($) 0.705 0.857 1.15 0.567 0.741 0.97 
Big4 0.980 0.905 -1.11 1 1 -1.71 * 
Vl 
~ 
TABLE 7 (continued) 
Panel C: Regression results for fmn-year observations that issue seasoned equity in the following year 
(l)Abs_DA (Ht) (2) Pos_DA (Ht) (3) Neg_DA (Ht) (4) RM(Hz) 
Pred. Pre d. Pred. Pred. 
Variable sign Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.080 5.71 *** -0.199 -2.26 ** 0.337 1.94 -0.123 -2.23 ** 
Experimental 
variables: 
Claw ? -0.013 -1.41 ? -0.041 - 1.04 ? 0.009 0.13 ? 0.061 1.40 
Clawafter - -0.028 
-2.79 *** - -0.034 -0.34 + 0.592 1.63 * +I- -0.132 -2.02 ** 
Control 
variables: 
logMV ? 0.002 0.76 ? -0.004 -0.31 ? -0.007 -0.40 ? 0.047 3.05 *** 
MTB ? 0.001 0.92 ? -0.003 -0.51 ? 0.000 0.02 ? -0.036 --4.11 *** 
ROA ? -0.129 -1.96 * + 1.027 4.87 *** + 1.072 4.53 *** ? 0.206 0.95 
Leverage ? 0.006 0.25 + 0.068 1.01 + 0.299 1.74 ** + 0.286 3.08 *** 
NOA ? -0.029 
-3.56 *** - -0.141 -2.69 *** ? 0.027 0.44 + 0.087 2.64 *** 
Big4 - 0.000 -0.01 - 0.015 0.29 + -0.123 -1.16 + 0.027 0.43 
Adj-R2 0.099 N/A NIA 0.190 
N 510 290 220 510 
Notes: 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the SEO subsarnple (clawback-adopters and non-adopters), and Panel B the 
descriptive statistics for the SEO clawback-adopters in the pre- and post-adoption period. Panel C presents the regression 
results from estimating the effect of clawback adoption on earnings management under higher incentive setting using the SEO 
subsample. Panel C examines regressions of the following form: 
EM;, = ao + a1Claw;, + a2Clawajter;, + a3logMV;, + a4MFB;, + asROA;, + a6Leverageit + a7NOAit + asBig4it + c:;, 
This subsarnple contains 510 firm-year observations over 2000 to 20 ll , having seasoned equity offering in year t+ I. * * *, * *, 
and * denote statistical significance at the l %, 5%, and l 0% levels, based on t-statistics for difference in means or z-statistics 
for difference in medians in Panel A and Panel B, and one-tailed (two-tailed) tests of significance for variables with (without) a 
Vl 
Vl 
TABLE 7 (continued) 
directional prediction. The !-statistics in column (1) and (4) in Panel Care calculated using robust standard errors that are 
clustered at the firm level. Appendix A provides variable definitions. The dependent variable is EM, alternatively defined as: 
absolute discretionary accruals (Abs _ DA) in column (1 ); positive discretionary accruals (Pas_ DA) in column (2); negative 
discretionary accruals (Neg_DA) in column (3); and real activities manipulation (RM) in column (4). Truncated regressions are 
used when the dependent variables are positive and negative discretionary accruals in column (2) and (3), respectively, and 
thus Adj-R2 is not available. 
TABLES 
The Effect of Clawback Adoption on Earnings Management under High Incentive Settings: 
Subsample of Firm-Year Observations That Just Meets/Beats Earnings Benchmarks 
Panel A: Just meet/beat subsample (adopters vs. non-adopters) 
Mean Median 
Non- Non-
Clawback Clawback Clawback Clawback 
firms firms firms firms 
Variable (N=1 ,623) (N=867) Diff. t-stat (N=1 ,623) (N=867) Diff. z-stat 
Abs DA 0.050 0.041 
-4.34 *** 0.035 0.029 -4.19 *** 
A_Disexp 0.018 0.060 5.02 *** 0.037 0.073 -4.61 *** 
A Prod -0.024 -0.001 2.97 *** -0.017 0.005 3.51 *** 
VI RM -0.006 0.060 4.26 *** 0.021 0.089 4.58 *** 
0"1 logAssets 6.843 8.031 18.59 *** 6.782 7.861 17.37 *** 
logMV 7.020 8.157 17.51 *** 6.887 8.061 16.42 *** 
MTB 3.135 3.423 2.33 ** 2.245 2.656 5.03 *** 
ROA 0.059 0.068 2.79 *** 0.056 0.066 3.96 *** 
Leverage 0.196 0.230 4.40 *** 0.159 0.215 5.89 *** 
NOA ($) 0.691 0.702 0.40 0.562 0.569 0.46 
Big4 0.929 0.978 6.12 *** 1 1 5.20 *** 
TABLE 8 (continued) 
Panel B: Clawback adopters in the Just meet/beat subsample (pre- vs. post-) 
Mean Median 
Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
adoption adoption adoption adoption 
period period period period 
Variable (N=680) (N=187) Diff. t-stat (N=680) (N=187) Diff. z-stat 
Abs DA 0.043 0.035 
-2.75 *** 0.030 0.028 -1.65 * 
A_Disexp 0.060 0.061 0.05 0.074 0.069 0.84 
A Prod -0.002 0.005 0.46 0.007 -0.010 -0.19 
RM 0.058 0.066 0.26 0.093 0.066 -0.65 
logAssets 7.883 8.569 5.42 *** 7.652 8.537 5.47 *** 
logMV 8.052 8.540 3.74 *** 7.924 8.533 3.69 *** 
Vl MTB 3.469 3.256 -0.82 2.690 2.526 -1.85 * ......:1 
ROA 0.068 0.070 0.57 0.065 0.068 0.94 
Leverage 0.228 0.239 0.76 0.210 0.227 0.97 
NOA ($) 0.702 0.703 0.01 0.562 0.614 0.61 
Big4 0.984 0.957 -1.70 * 1 1 -2.20 ** 
Vl 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
Panel C: Regression results for ftrm-year observations that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks 
(1) Abs_DA (H1) (2) Pos_DA (H1) (3) Neg_DA (H1) (4) RM(Hz) 
Pre d. Pre d. Pre d. Pred. 
Variable sign Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.059 10.13 *** -0.128 -3.39 *** 1.364 1.27 -0.066 -1.13 
Experimental 
variables: 
Claw ? -0.003 -1.17 ? 0.001 0.11 ? 0.362 1.21 ? 0.033 1.32 
Claw after - -0.008 
-2.44 *** - -0.027 -0.99 + 0.761 1.12 +I- -0.001 -0.02 
Control 
variables: 
logMV ? -0.004 
-3 .94 *** ? -0.030 -5.42 *** ? 0.021 0.38 ? 0.036 4.29 *** 
MTB ? 0.002 3.18 *** ? -0.003 -1.19 ? -0.084 -1.60 ? -0.047 -8.70 *** 
ROA ? 0.025 0.68 + 0.847 8.35 *** + 5.299 1.69 ** ? -0.256 -1.95 * 
Leverage ? 0.012 1.12 + 0.141 3.72 *** + -0.220 -0.55 + 0.311 5.52 *** 
NOA ? -0.007 
-3.23 *** - -0.062 -3.59 *** ? 0.313 1.21 + -0.006 -0.33 
Big4 - -0.002 -0.44 - -0.006 -0.25 + 0.580 1.17 + 0.036 0.62 
Adj-R2 0.033 N/A N/A 0.167 
N 2,490 1,498 992 2,490 
Notes: 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the Just meet/beat subsample (clawback-adopters and non-adopters), and Panel B 
the descriptive statistics for the clawback-adopters in the pre- and post-adoption period. Panel C presents the regression results 
from estimating the effect of clawback adoption on earnings management under higher incentive setting using the Just 
meet/beat subsample. Panel C examines regressions of the following form: 
EMu = ao + a1Clawit + a2Clawajterit + a3logMVit + a4MI'Bu + a5ROAu + a6Leverageit + a7NOAit + asBig4it + c:u 
This subsample contains 2,490 firm-year observations that just meet/beat earnings benchmark over 2000 to 2011. ***, **,and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, based on t-statistics for difference in means or z-statistics for 
difference in medians in Panel A and Panel B, and one-tailed (two-tailed) tests of significance for variables with (without) a 
Vl 
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TABLE 8 (continued) 
directional prediction. The t-statistics in column (1) and (4) in Panel Care calculated using robust standard errors that are 
clustered at the firm level. Appendix A provides variable definitions. The dependent variable is EM, alternatively defined as: 
absolute discretionary accruals (Abs _ DA) in column (1 ); positive discretionary accruals (Pas _DA) in column (2); negative 
discretionary accruals (Neg_DA) in column (3); and real activities manipulation (RM) in column (4). Truncated regressions are 
used when the dependent variables are positive and negative discretionary accruals in column (2) and (3), respectively, and 
thus Adj-R2 is not available. 
0\ 
0 
(l)Abs DA (HI) 
Pred. Pre d. 
Variable sign Coeff. t-stat sign 
Intercept 0.081 21.25 *** 
Experimental 
variables: 
Claw ? --0.005 
-2.62 *** ? 
Clawafter - --0.012 
-5.88 *** -
Control 
variables: 
logMV ? 0.001 0.83 ? 
MTB ? 0.003 6.92 *** ? 
ROA ? --0.167 
-5.76 *** + 
Leverage ? --0.002 --0.28 + 
NOA ? --0.011 
-6.45 *** -
Big4 - --0.010 
-3.06 *** -
Dual ? --0.004 
-3.08 *** ? 
Adj-R2 0.101 
N 13,451 
Notes: 
TABLE9 
Alternate Control Variable 
(2) Pas DA (HI) (3) Neg DA (HI) 
Pre d. 
Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. t-stat 
--0.302 
-7.42 *** 0.214 7.16 *** 
0.000 0.01 ? 0.007 0.50 
--0.037 
-1.83 ** + 0.109 3.91 *** 
--0.042 
-8.84 *** ? 0.000 0.06 
--0.003 -1.54 ? --0.012 
-7.94 *** 
1.204 12.38 *** + 1.050 27.33 *** 
0.067 2.65 *** + --0.017 --0.59 
--0.059 
--4.67 *** ? 0.031 2.46 ** 
0.000 --0.03 + 0.049 2.22 *** 
--0.009 --0.97 ? 0.038 3.24 *** 
N/A N/A 
7,550 5,901 
(4) RM(Hz) 
Pred. 
sign Coeff. t-stat 
--0.077 -2.30 ** 
? 0.023 1.20 
+I- --0.033 -2.24 ** 
? 0.029 4.26 *** 
? --0.041 
-11.3 *** 
? --0.187 -2.36 ** 
+ 0.277 7.73 *** 
+ O.o18 1.36 * 
+ 0.023 0.70 
? 0.025 2.05 ** 
0.133 
13,451 
This table presents the regression results from estimating the effect of clawback adoption on earnings management with an 
additional corporate governance proxy. This table examines regressions ofthe following form: 
EMu = ao + O.JClawu + 0.2Clawajteru + O.JlogMVu + 0.4MTBu + 0.5ROAu + 0.6Leverageit + 0.7NOAu + o.aBig4u 
+ 0.9Dualil + c:u 
The sample contains 13,451 firm-year observations over 2000 to 2011. ***,**,and* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests of significance for variables with (without) a 
0'1 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
directional prediction. The t-statistics in column (1) and (4) are calculated using robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
firm level. Appendix A provides variable definitions. The dependent variable is EM, alternatively defined as: absolute 
discretionary accruals (Abs _ DA) in column (1 ); positive discretionary accruals (Pas_ DA) in column (2); negative discretionary 
accruals (Neg_DA) in column (3); and real activities manipulation (RM) in column (4). Truncated regressions are used when 
the dependent variables are positive and negative discretionary accruals in column (2) and (3), respectively, and thus Adj-R2 is 
not available. Truncated regressions are used when the dependent variables are positive and negative discretionary accruals in 
column (2) and (3), respectively, and thus Adj-R2 is not available. 
0'\ 
N 
TABLE 10 
Alternate Definition for Post-Adoption Period 
(l)Abs DA (H1) (2) Pas DA (H,) (3) Neg_ DA (H1) (4)RM(H2) 
Pre d. Pre d. Pre d. Pred. 
Variable sign Coeff. t-stat sign Coeff. !-stat sign Coeff. !-stat sign Coeff. !-stat 
Intercept 0.086 20.39 *** -0.322 -7.95 *** 0.221 7.29 *** -0.080 -2.12 ** 
Experimental 
variables: 
Claw ? -0.008 
-3.68 *** ? -0.005 -0.40 ? 0.022 1.50 ? 0.021 1.05 
After ? -{).009 
-5.50 *** ? -0.007 -0.62 ? 0.026 1.80 * ? 0.001 0.09 
Claw*After - -{).004 
-1.80 ** - -0.038 -1.55 * + 0.094 2.95 *** +/- -0.028 -1.68 * 
Control 
variables: 
logMV ? 0.000 0.01 ? -0.046 -9.73 *** ? 0.006 1.64 ? 0.033 4.88 *** 
MTB ? 0.003 7.68 *** ? -0.001 -0.42 ? -0.014 -9.36 *** ? -0.045 -12.61 *** 
ROA ? -{).169 
-6.40 *** + 1.222 13.08 *** + 0.988 29.03 *** ? -0.113 -1.55 
Leverage ? -{).005 -0.91 + 0.067 2.74 *** + 0.014 0.51 + 0.303 8.48 *** 
NOA ? . -D.O 11 
-6.80 *** - -0.065 -5.09 *** ? 0.028 2.26 ** + 0.025 2.05 ** 
Big4 - -{).013 
-3.58 *** - 0.004 0.24 + 0.053 2.52 *** + 0.023 0.61 
Acij-R2 0.108 N/A N/A 0.133 
N 14,823 8,332 6,491 14,823 
Notes: 
This table presents the robustness test from estimating the effect of clawback adoption on earnings management using alternate 
definition of post -adoption period for non-adopters. This table examines regressions of the following form: 
EMit = ( o + ( 1Clawu + ( 2Ajterit + ( JClawu*Afterit + ( 4/ogMVit + ( sMTBu + ( 6ROAit + ( 7Leverageu + ( sNOAit 
+ ( 9Big4u + c:u 
The sample contains 14,823 firm-year observations over 2000 to 2011. * * *, * *, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests of significance for variables with (without) a 
directional prediction. The !-statistics in column (1) and (4) are calculated using robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
0\ 
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TABLE 10 (continued) 
firm level. Appendix A provides variable definitions. After equals one if the clawback-adopters are in the post-adoption period, 
or for control firms, if fiscal year is after 2008. The dependent variable is EM, alternatively defined as: absolute discretionary 
accruals (Abs_DA) in column (1); positive discretionary accruals (Pos_DA) in column (2); negative discretionary accruals 
(Neg_DA) in column (3); and real activities manipulation (RM) in column (4). Truncated regressions are used when the 
dependent variables are positive and negative discretionary accruals in column (2) and (3), respectively, and thus Adj-R2 is not 
available. 
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